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ABSTRACT 
This research note makes the case for further historical work comparing the military 
occupations of Japan and Iraq. Despite serious differences, a comparison of these 
two related events reveals long-term trends. These include Anglo-American strategic 
and economic thinking, questions of legitimacy in military occupations, how policy 
planning works, the problem of interagency rivalry in foreign policy making, and the 
limitations of advance planning.   
 
 
Peace is a strange word. It is an abstract noun, neither singular nor plural. As we reflect 
on the end of the Second World War from 75 years remove, we see that it ended 
not with one peace, but with many separate peaces, in different places at different 
times. There are clear demarcation points for the end of hostilities in 1945: 8 May in 
Europe, 15 August in Asia. But for the vanquished, peace was a thing that developed 
in the space between surrender, foreign military occupation, and the eventual 
transition to returned sovereignty. 
 
This long liminal space between war and peace had profound impacts on the occupied, 
occupiers, and on world order. It is no surprise then that American-led postwar Allied 
military occupations have inspired a vast historical literature. Historians have 
considered a diversity of national and subnational perspectives, and myriad effects 
 
*Dayna Barnes is an Associate Professor in Modern History, and Director of the 
Centre for Modern History, City, University of London. 
DOI: 10.25602/GOLD.bjmh.v6i3.1433 
1As an historian of the occupation of Japan, the author has been considering the 
themes in this article for some time and would like to thank Stephen Stedman and the 
Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford, Daniel Wirls 
at UC Santa Cruz, and Atul Bhardwaj and Inderjeet Parmar, organisers of the ‘US 
Think Tanks and Foundations in World Politics Workshop’ for providing the space to 
develop these ideas.  
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from social to political to environmental.2 But while so much has been written on the 
war and on individual occupations, relatively little historical work has been done 
bringing the separate ‘peaces’ together in comparative perspective. 3 This research 
note presents a call for more comparative work on occupations. 
 
Several factors have gotten in the way of such work. The expansion of the field of 
diplomatic history into multilingual research has reinvigorated the field and driven a 
corpus of excellent globalised work which looks beyond Anglo-American 
perspectives. However, this also leads to a sort of siloing of researchers into area 
specialisations. Historians with expertise in Japan, Germany, Korea, or Italy, all 
countries occupied in the wake of the Second World War, infrequently read each 
other or ‘compare notes’ at academic conferences as they work in what appear to be 
very different subfields. Rare is the historian who can conduct research in all of these 
languages or who has deep knowledge of the history of each country. 
 
This siloing problem is even greater when considering the more recent but related 
occupation of Iraq, which is separated by not only region but also era. John Dower, a 
giant in the field of the Occupation of Japan, blazed a trail when he published Cultures 
of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9–11/Iraq in 2010.4 In regard to such complex 
comparative work, Ussama Makdisi, a specialist in modern Arab history, asks ‘what 
 
2Laura Hein’s ‘Revisiting America's Occupation of Japan,’ Cold War History, 11, 4 (2011), 
pp. 579-599, is a useful survey of the literature on Japan. For a consideration of current 
trends in the early Occupation of Germany, see Gareth Pritchard, ‘The Occupation 
of Germany in 1945 and the Politics of German History,’ History Compass 7, 2 (2009), 
pp. 447–473. 
3Some examples evaluating the occupations of Germany and Japan together include, 
Susan Carruthers, The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Masako Shibata, Japan and Germany 
under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of Post-War Education Reform, (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2008); and Melissa Willard-Foster, ‘Planning the Peace and 
Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan,’ 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 40, 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 33–56.  Comparisons also 
appear in International Relations literature on nation building. For example, Francis 
Fukuyama’s edited volume draws historical comparisons between Germany, Japan and 
many other American reconstruction projects and interventions in the context of 
understanding 21 Century American nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan. Francis 
Fukuyama ed., Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, (Johns Hopkins, 2006). 
4John Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor/Hiroshima/9–11/Iraq, (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2010). The book presents sweeping comparisons of the immediate origins 
and ends of both conflicts, and the third part of the work is devoted to comparing the 
occupations. 
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kind of expertise or collaboration is required to take […] [such a juxtaposition] to its 
full potential?’5 There is a sense that such research focus is too big to be undertaken 
alone. As most work on such recent events has so far been done by political scientists 
rather than historians, this comparison also requires overcoming a divide by academic 
discipline. 6 In the face of these challenges, much remains to explore. 
 
When looking at these ‘peaces’ in tandem, the connections are compelling. The 
occupations which began in 1945 were planned and overseen by many of the same 
individuals, and all were based on common assumptions and constraints. This led to 
similar policies and similar problems, such as the tension between troop numbers, 
costs, and political will, or the practice of purging elites associated with the old regime, 
which proved problematic and was rolled back in the cases of Germany, Japan, and 
Iraq. Further, despite a sense that 2003 is ‘not yet history,’ an increasing number of 
primary source documents are available that make well founded historical work 
possible. These include the online partial archives of former United States Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a wealth of material available via the National Security 
Archive, and published oral histories and interviews. These can be combined with the 
deep existing historical literature on individual post-1945 military occupations and 
political science work done on Iraq to generate new historical analysis. This new area 
of historical research has the potential to help us better understand both the older 
and the more recent past. 
 
 
 
 
5Laura Hein et al., ‘Cultures of War Roundtable,’ Critical Asian Studies, 43, 3 (2011), p. 
447. 
6James Savage’s Reconstructing Iraq's Budgetary Institutions: Coalition State Building After 
Saddam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) is an example of the excellent 
empirical research which is possible despite archival limitations. So too is Stephen 
Benedict Dyson’s, ‘What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq?’ Political Science 
Quarterly, 128, 3 (2013), pp 455-488. Inderjeet Parmar considers the start of each 
conflict in ‘Catalysing Events, Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy Shifts: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 2001,’ 
Government and Opposition, 40, 1 (2005), pp. 1-25. Political scientists have also used 
theoretical frameworks to consider ‘why did one occupation succeed and the other 
fail?’. Examples of this approach include Jeff Bridoux, American Foreign Policy and Postwar 
Reconstruction: Comparing Japan and Iraq, (London: Routledge, 2011) and Jonathan 
Monten ‘Intervention and State-Building: Comparative Lessons from Japan, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan,’ The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 656, 1 
(November, 2014), pp. 173-191. However, with a few exceptions, historians are yet 
to weigh in on the occupation of  Iraq.  
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Comparing Japan and Iraq 
On first sight, the American-led multilateral post-conflict military occupations of Japan 
and Iraq have obvious differences that discourage comparison.7 First, as they say, the 
past is another country. The global situation in 1945 bears little resemblance to that 
of 2003. Nor did the lead occupying powers, the United States with the major 
involvement of Britain, closely resemble the countries they had been 60 years prior. 
Second, the nations of pre-occupation Japan and Iraq had very little in common. The 
population of Japan is largely homogenous, where Iraq contains religious and ethnic 
divisions. The geographies are different. Japan is an island archipelago, with no shared 
land borders over which chaos or outside influence could easily spill. Pre-invasion Iraq 
was neighbour to hostile and more powerful states, while prewar Japan had been the 
dominant actor in its region. 
 
Prewar Japan was a leading world power and an established democracy. Although 
there was a marked rise in ultranationalism and militarization in the 1930s (largely in 
response to domestic terrorism), the country had complex political, financial and 
industrial institutions, a constitution and parliament established in the late nineteenth 
century, and (from 1925) universal male suffrage. As Chalmers Johnson persuasively 
argued, the stability and economic success of postwar Japan owes much to the legacy 
of its prewar system, not its seven years of foreign occupation.8 By contrast, pre-
invasion Iraq was not a major developed power. As political sociologist Larry Diamond 
describes, Iraq ‘had no prior experience of democracy as a system of government’ 
beyond fragmentary institutions created in the British colonial period. 9 In its recent 
history lay ten years of war followed by ten years of crippling international economic 
sanctions. 
 
The conditions of the occupations were also very different. Years of war and a 
prolonged bombing campaign targeting Japan’s cities, and the public surrender of the 
country’s leadership, made it clear to the Japanese people that total war had turned 
to total defeat, making resistance futile. By contrast, there was no clear ‘point of no 
return’ in Iraq’s case. The government collapsed, but its head of state was missing for 
the first nine months of occupation. In a situation where the old regime could re-
emerge, and the occupying powers could leave quickly as they had a decade earlier 
 
7While both of these occupations were multilateral, with a significant role played by 
Great Britain, this article focuses on the United States as the primary driver of policy 
making.  
8Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-
1975, (Stanford, 1982). 
9Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to 
Bring Democracy to Iraq, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2005), p. 24.  
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after the first Gulf War, cooperation/collaboration with the occupiers was a 
dangerous gamble that risked the reprisal of a future state. These conditions help 
explain a significant difference in the occupations; ‘while not a single Allied soldier was 
killed in occupied Japan or Germany, the occupation of Iraq has led to [thousands of] 
U.S. and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilian fatalities.’10 
 
And yet the ‘Japan model’ was consciously used to justify and define exploits in Iraq. 
Since then, the violence, destruction, and chaos which arose as a result of these Anglo-
American actions have in turn led historians to reconsider the occupation of Japan 
through a more critical lens. The remainder of this piece will introduce possible points 
of comparison and consider what a careful examination might reveal. 
 
Big Ideas 
Comparing the cases of Japan and Iraq illuminates long-term trends in American 
political thought and approach to foreign policy. Generally speaking, the dominant 
contemporary American view of economic theory and development defined the aims 
and policies of both occupations. It is certainly true that this led to very different 
economic policies in each case. 1930s-era New Deal paradigms led to support for 
initiatives including land reforms and increased labour rights, while neo-conservative 
ideals of the 2000s created support for privatisation in both the Iraqi economy and in 
carrying out the occupation itself.11 Despite marked differences, the approaches rhyme 
in that they were shaped by an emphasis on capitalism and free trade. Crucially, in 
both cases, re-entry into the international community was understood to be tied to 
dependence on foreign exports (in Japan silk and textiles, in Iraq oil) for economic 
growth. 
 
In both cases, arguments about the justification and legitimacy of American actions 
reveal how U.S. policy is shaped by the racial, religious, and cultural biases held by the 
public and government officials.12 For example, American policy makers used the cover 
of gender and women’s rights to legitimise an expansionist foreign policy in both 
instances. Japanese and Iraqi women were depicted as ‘subject-objects of American 
liberation and recipients of… liberal feminist tutelage.’13 Once the occupation was 
underway, a powerful military figure served as the face of both occupations. Military 
authority was given primacy over civilian in Iraq because ‘the prestige of the victorious 
 
10Hein et al., ‘Cultures of War Roundtable,’ p. 445. 
11Dower, Cultures of War, pp. 426-427, and Savage, Reconstructing Iraq's Budgetary 
Institutions, p. 48. 
12Dower, Cultures of War, pp. 50-58.  
13Lisa Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese 
War Crimes, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), p. 90. 
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General was translated into his post-conflict legitimacy.’14 However, there were other 
strong claims to legitimacy in Japan. 
 
A pronounced legitimacy gap is a point of distinction between occupations. As Laura 
Hein argues, there were no international protests against the 1945 action. Japan itself 
had occupied and colonialised spaces after military victory, so domestic opinion was 
that the same actions were legitimate in the face of the country’s own defeat. Allied 
occupiers also worked through existing government institutions.15 The unconditional 
surrender of that government provided legal cover for such a military action.16 None 
of these factors existed in the case of Iraq. Instead, the actions of the Coalition of the 
Willing were met with public protest around the world, and hostilities ended not with 
formal surrender, but government collapse and the disappearance of Iraq’s leader. 
Rather than working through a defeated and cooperative government, plans to 
transition authority back into Iraqi hands were centered on ‘illegitimate bodies’ 
constructed, as one American advisor argued, because of ‘the contradiction between 
our aspiration for democracy… and our impulse for total unilateral control’.17 Despite, 
or perhaps because of, the legitimacy gap between the interventions, the perceived 
benevolent success of General Douglas MacArthur loomed large in attempts to claim 
legitimacy in the occupation in Iraq. 
 
The Process of Planning 
Occupation planning is another point of continuity and contrast. While the length of 
the planning periods differed greatly, in both cases planning was undermined by 
interagency competition, involved external experts from think tanks and universities, 
and created a community of ‘planning alumni’ who retained influence in the occupation 
phase and beyond. However, both processes failed to accurately predict the situation 
on the ground. 
 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the planning phases was duration. 
Official planning for the treatment of postwar Japan began in 1942 with the creation 
of an interdepartmental committee drawing on staff and reports from a previous 
secret collaboration between the State Department and the Council on Foreign 
Relations begun in 1939, six years before VJ day. Planning for Iraq can be dated from 
November 2001, less than a year and a half before the invasion, when the Secretary 
 
14Dyson, ‘What Really Happened,’ p. 463. 
15Hein, ‘Revisiting America’s Occupation of Japan’, p. 592, note 5. 
16The motivations behind American insistence on unconditional surrender is tied to 
the use of the atomic bomb and has long been the subject of historical debate. The 
issue has been examined most recently by Marc Gallicchio in Unconditional: The 
Japanese Surrender in World War II, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).  
17Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 62.  
British Journal for Military History, Volume 6, Issue 3, November 2020 
 www.bjmh.org.uk  174 
of Defense directed The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to develop a 
plan for the forcible removal of Saddam Hussein.18 Both planning processes were 
largely conducted in secret. In Japan’s case, this was because revealing American 
postwar aims might cause division between the Allies while the war was on. In the 
case of Iraq, it was because the American government had not officially committed to 
conflict, so could not advertise looming invasion and post-invasion plans. 
 
Wrangling between agencies was also an issue in both processes, although there was 
a clearer demarcation of responsibility in Japan’s case. The State Department was 
responsible for setting long range political aims, while War and Navy departments 
were tasked with the practicalities of invasion and security stabilization. War and Navy 
had a larger voice in planning once an end of the war came into view, but by then 
outlines has already been set.19 This long mid-level iterative process with regular buy-
in from cabinet level officials, resulted in consensus building and a single set of 
approved policy documents outlining aims to guide the occupation.20 And yet, despite 
that consensus, during the occupation itself the Diplomatic Section in Tokyo was 
undermined by restrictions to its direct communication back to the State Department 
in Washington.21 
 
In the case of Iraq, the Department of Defense took the lead. In stark contrast to the 
clear division of responsibility between agencies on Japan, the first CENTCOM 
recommendations for Iraq included a set long range political goals.22 In addition to the 
blurred division of areas of responsibility, there was not good coordination between 
agencies or planning groups. In fact, there was in many cases a concerted effort to 
avoid collaboration and information sharing. National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
 
18Stephen Benedict Dyson has done the best work to date in reconstructing the Iraq 
planning process. 
19Treasury was effectively kept out of Japan planning (but not planning on Germany) 
by State manoeuvring. For an overview of official planning on Japan, see Dayna Barnes, 
Architects of Occupation: American Experts and the Planning for Postwar Japan, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2017), pp. 31-37.  
20These two documents are SWNCC150/4 and JCS 1380/15. Both are available at 
Japan’s National Diet Library website. 
https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01shiryo.html. Accessed October 2020.  
21Eiji Takamae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, Translated and 
adapted by Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann, (London: Continuum, 2002), p. 149.  
22End objectives according to then CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks were the 
‘establishment of a representative form of government, a country capable of defending 
its territorial borders and maintaining its internal security without any weapons of 
mass destruction.’ Nora Benshel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation 
of Iraq, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), p. 7. 
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Rice, for example, ‘frequently sent her own spies to the Defense Department in hopes 
of surreptitiously collecting the information she and her staff needed to do their 
jobs.’23 The result of this is clear in a statement made by Larry MacDonald, Deputy 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Technical Assistance Policy. ‘People speak in 
shorthand about whether there was a plan for Iraq,’ he said, ‘I think it is more relevant 
to speak of plans. There were plans, there were lots of plans, created at different times 
by different agencies and levels of government.’24 This disharmony continued into the 
occupation. Coalition Provisional Authority head Paul Bremer and others were 
reported to have distrusted and underused the State Department and experienced 
diplomats.25 Infighting and information hoarding marked both cases, but were more 
damaging in the planning for Iraq. 
 
In both cases, these planning processes established and reinforced an informal policy 
network of officials, academics, and think tank experts, who wrote policy 
recommendations and influenced opinion. In both cases, the work of anthropologists 
was brought in to occupation policy-making and personnel training materials in order 
to ‘understand’ spaces beyond the knowledge of most Americans.26 During the Second 
World War, area specialists from the Council on Foreign Relations’ War and Peace 
Studies Program were hired into government planning, and think tanks played an 
important role in providing expertise and platforms for exchanging ideas.27 At the turn 
of the 21 Century, experts and elite exiled Iraqis were brought together by the State 
Department in planning discussion groups known as the FoI Project, and think tank 
publications were circulated amongst policy makers. 28 
 
During and after the occupations, these policy network members took on important 
positions in Washington, Tokyo, and Bagdad. Feisal Istrabadi and Salem Chalabi, for 
 
23Zachary Shore, Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions, (London: Bloomsbury, 
2008), p. 208. 
24 Savage, Reconstructing Iraq's Budgetary Institutions, p. 49. 
25Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 299. 
26Ruth Benedict’s Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1946) was highly influential. For more on anthropology and the 
‘cultural turn’ in U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, see Sheila Jager, On the Uses 
of Cultural Knowledge (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2007). 
27Dayna Barnes, ‘Think Tanks and a New Order in East Asia: The Council of Foreign 
Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations During World War II,’ Journal of 
American-East Asian Relations, 22, 2 (2015) pp. 89-119. 
28For example, Paul Bremer ‘forwarded a RAND corporation study on postwar 
governance to Secretary Rumsfeld with his summary of its lessons’ in May 2003. 
Dyson, ‘What Really Happened,’ p. 478. 
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example, had worked as expats on the FoI’s Democratic Principles working group, 
and later in Iraq as lead drafters of the interim constitution in 2004.29 Chris Milligan, 
who was involved in USAID planning from October 2002 became USAID Deputy 
Mission Director in Iraq.30 There were many such figures in the case of Japan too, 
although because that policy network was devoid of expatriates their influence was 
confined to US policy making. Robert Fearey was a junior State Department official 
who worked on Japan planning and was tasked with land reform policy making because 
of that experience.31 For years after planning gave way to implementation, these 
‘alumni’ continued to draw on their planning experiences and make real impact on the 
post-conflict landscape. 
 
What Planning Missed 
Neither occupation started as planned. Soon-to-be occupying forces experienced 
‘catastrophic success,’ an unexpectedly early surrender or collapse and shift from 
invasion to occupation. In Japan, to the surprise of military and civilians alike, there 
was no invasion at all. Planners expected a protracted struggle, and even in plans for 
a sudden collapse expected mass resistance and hostility. The US military anticipated 
that ‘at best the civil population of JAPAN proper will observe an attitude of non-
cooperation.’32 The Joint War Plans Committee warned that once an occupation 
began, ‘suicidal elements’ of armed Japanese would target occupying forces.33 The plans 
for Iraq were ‘predicated on the assumption that the Iraqis would be passive. Not only 
passive, but gratefully, happily passive.’34 Americans also ‘overestimated the degree to 
which the remnants of the Iraqi government would provide essential services and 
security’ during the occupation.35 While counterinsurgency plans for Japan went 
 
29Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 145. 
30Savage, Reconstructing Iraq's Budgetary Institutions, p. 64.  
31‘The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform’ in Lawrence Redford ed., 
The Proceedings of a Symposium Sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial, April 13-15, 
(Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial, 1980). 
32‘Basic Outline Plan for ‘Blacklist’ Operations,’ 8 August 1945, RG 4, reel 607, in 
General Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library Collection, (Scholarly 
Resources, 2002), microform.  
33War Plans Committee, ‘Over-all Examination of Planning for the Occupation of 
Japan, Appendix C, Brief Plan of Blacklist,’ August 3, 1945, in Kesaris (éd.), Records of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pacific Theater, Reel 5, 18, as cited in Melissa Willard-
Foster, ‘Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied 
Occupations of Germany and Japan,’ Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 40, 1 (Summer 
2009), p. 41.  
34Unnamed former senior official, quoted in Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 36.  
35Benshel et al., After Saddam, p. 13. 
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unneeded and unused, the case of Iraq makes clear how valuable the work might have 
been. Very little can be accomplished in the absence of minimum security. 
 
Policies were implemented to purge elites connected with the previous regime in 
Japan, Germany, and Iraq. In all three cases, these policies, also known as ‘de-
Nazification’ and ‘de-Baathification’ where later understood to have hindered growth 
by sidelining the political and economic expertise in the occupied countries, and were 
rolled back. However, in Iraq de-Baathification had more serious consequences, 
exacerbating existing divisions within the population and fuelling insurgency.36 The 
worst results of policy missteps in Japan were avoided because the occupation was 
perceived to have greater legitimacy, and because Japan had retained its emperor; a 
potent symbol of national unity, continuity, and stability, who willingly cooperated with 
the occupation authority. 
 
Conclusion 
75 years after the war’s end, important stories of how peace came remain to be told. 
We are at the beginning of a new conversation about post- Second World War 
military occupation transitions, how they are connected to each other and to later 
occupations, and how they still resonate in a very different world today. Comparing 
these events provides fresh perspectives, and invites new conclusions about the once-
familiar past. Observing Iraq and Japan together reveals more than just politically 
convenient use of memory, but also long-term trends in Anglo-American foreign 
policy and political thought. The expansionist policy choices made in 1945 and in 2003 
were based on contemporary cultural assumptions and power dynamics, and on beliefs 
about economics, ‘universal values,’ democratisation, and development. More 
historical work is needed to understand not just why one ‘succeeded’ and the other 
‘failed,’ but why there are such marked similarities in the conception, planning, and 
implementation of these two projects separated by decades and continents. Looking 
beyond one single occupation at the connections between them can help us better 
understand the peaces that were and the peace that was not. 
 
 
36Diamond, Squandered Victory, p. 40. 
